ID

VAR-200504-0003

CVE

CVE-2004-0791

TITLE

The Border Gateway Protocol relies on persistent TCP sessions without specifying authentication requirements

DESCRIPTION

Multiple TCP/IP and ICMP implementations allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (network throughput reduction for TCP connections) via a blind throughput-reduction attack using spoofed Source Quench packets, aka the "ICMP Source Quench attack." NOTE: CVE-2004-0790, CVE-2004-0791, and CVE-2004-1060 have been SPLIT based on different attacks; CVE-2005-0065, CVE-2005-0066, CVE-2005-0067, and CVE-2005-0068 are related identifiers that are SPLIT based on the underlying vulnerability. While CVE normally SPLITs based on vulnerability, the attack-based identifiers exist due to the variety and number of affected implementations and solutions that address the attacks instead of the underlying vulnerabilities. A vulnerability exists in the reliance of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) on the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) to maintain persistent sessions. Sustained exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to a denial-of-service condition affecting a large segment of the Internet community. Normal operations would most likely resume shortly after the attack stopped. In multiple vendor products TCP The implementation of ICMP Included in error message IP Address and TCP There is a flaw that only validates the port and does not check that the sequence number is in the proper range. This ICMP source quench Established by processing error messages TCP There is a vulnerability that reduces connection throughput. The vulnerability is ICMP Vulnerabilities resulting from message processing (CVE-2004-0790, CVE-2004-0791, CVE-2004-1060) Out of CVE-2004-0791 Vulnerability published as. TCP Due to vulnerabilities that affect implementation, a wide range of products are affected by these vulnerabilities. For more information, NISCC-532967 (JVN) , NISCC Advisory 532967/NISCC/ICMP (CPNI Advisory 00303) Please check also.Intentionally created fraud ICMP By processing error messages TCP Connection is reset, resulting in service disruption (DoS) It can cause a condition. Multiple vendor implementations of TCP/IP Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) are reported prone to several denial-of-service attacks. ICMP is employed by network nodes to determine certain automatic actions to take based on network failures reported by an ICMP message. Reportedly, the RFC doesn't recommend security checks for ICMP error messages. As long as an ICMP message contains a valid source and destination IP address and port pair, it will be accepted for an associated connection. The following individual attacks are reported: - A blind connection-reset attack. This attack takes advantage of the specification that describes that on receiving a 'hard' ICMP error, the corresponding connection should be aborted. The Mitre ID CAN-2004-0790 is assigned to this issue. A remote attacker may exploit this issue to terminate target TCP connections and deny service for legitimate users. - An ICMP Source Quench attack. The Mitre ID CAN-2004-0791 is assigned to this issue. A remote attacker may exploit this issue to degrade the performance of TCP connections and partially deny service for legitimate users. - An attack against ICMP PMTUD is reported to affect multiple vendors when they are configured to employ PMTUD. By sending a suitable forged ICMP message to a target host, an attacker may reduce the MTU for a given connection. The Mitre ID CAN-2004-1060 is assigned to this issue. A remote attacker may exploit this issue to degrade the performance of TCP connections and partially deny service for legitimate users. **Update: Microsoft platforms are also reported prone to these issues. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 HP SECURITY BULLETIN HPSBUX01164 REVISION: 4 SSRT4884 rev.4 - HP-UX TCP/IP Remote Denial of Service (DoS) NOTICE: There are no restrictions for distribution of this Security Bulletin provided that it remains complete and intact. The information in this Security Bulletin should be acted upon as soon as possible. INITIAL RELEASE: 10 July 2005 POTENTIAL SECURITY IMPACT: Remote Denial of Service (DoS) SOURCE: Hewlett-Packard Company HP Software Security Response Team VULNERABILITY SUMMARY: A potential security vulnerability has been identified with HP-UX running TCP/IP. This vulnerability could be remotely exploited by an unauthorized user to cause a Denial of Service(DoS). REFERENCES: NISCC VU#532967, CAN-2004-0790, CAN-2004-0791, CAN-2004-1060 SUPPORTED SOFTWARE VERSIONS*: ONLY impacted versions are listed. HP-UX B.11.00, B.11.04, B.11.11, B.11.22, B.11.23 running TCP/IP. HP-UX B.11.11 and B.11.23 running TOUR (Transport Optional Upgrade Release). BACKGROUND: AFFECTED VERSIONS HP-UX B.11.22 HP-UX B.11.00 ============= Networking.NET2-KRN action: set ip_pmtu_strategy= 0 and either install binary files or filter ICMP HP-UX B.11.11 ============= Networking.NET2-KRN action: set ip_pmtu_strategy= 0 and install PHNE_33159 HP-UX B.11.23 ============= Networking.NET2-KRN ->action: set ip_pmtu_strategy= 0 and install PHNE_32606 HP-UX B.11.11 HP-UX B.11.23 ============= TOUR_PRODUCT.T-NET2-KRN action: set ip_pmtu_strategy= 0 and filter ICMP HP-UX B.11.04 ============= Networking.NET2-KRN action: set ip_pmtu_strategy= 0 and filter ICMP END AFFECTED VERSIONS Note: The latest TOUR (Transport Optional Upgrade Release), version 2.4, is available on B.11.11 only. The latest Transport Functionality is available to B.11.23 customers in the HP-UX 11i v2 September 2004 release. Customers using TOUR on B.11.23 can apply the workaround (set ip_pmtu_strategy= 0 and filter ICMP) or upgrade to the HP-UX 11i v2 September 2004 release. After upgrading the action for B.11.23 Networking.NET2-KRN listed above should be implemented. <http://www.uniras.gov.uk/niscc/docs/al-20050412-00308.html? lang=en> There are three issues reported in NISCC VU#532967: CVE number: CAN-2004-0790 <http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0790> CVE number: CAN-2004-0791 <http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0791> CVE number: CAN-2004-1060 <http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-1060> Workarounds are available for all three of these issues. Until binary files are available for B.11.04 the workarounds should be used. ->Binary files are available for CAN-2004-0790 and CAN-2004-0791 for HP-UX B.11.00 and B.11.22. Since PHNE_33159 is now available for B.11.11 the preliminary binary files for B.11.11 have been removed from the ftp site. ->Since PHNE_32606 is now available for B.11.23 the preliminary binary files for B.11.23 have been removed from the ftp site. Note: If the TOUR (Transport Optional Upgrade Release) product is installed the binary files cannot be used. Until the TOUR product is revised there are several options: B.11.11 1. Use the workarounds. or 2. Remove TOUR and install the binary files. B.11.23 1. Use the workarounds. or 2. Upgrade to the HP-UX 11i v2 September 2004 release and install the binary files. TOUR(Transport Optional Upgrade Release) is available from <http://www.hp.com/go/softwaredepot>. Workaround for CAN-2004-1060 may not be necessary. =================================== Although changes in the binary files and patches for CAN-2004-0790 and CAN-2004-0791 do not prevent the exploit of CAN-2004-1060, they do make it less likely to succeed. The sequence number check suggested in section 5.1 of <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/ draft-gont-tcpm-icmp-attacks-03.txt> has been implemented. Customers should consider whether this check reduces the risk of the exploit to the point that setting ip_pmtu_strategy=0 is not required. If the workaround for CAN-2004-1060 is to be used, please note the following: ================================================= HPSBUX01137 recommends setting ip_pmtu_strategy = 0 or 3 as a workaround for the problem of CAN-2005-1192. CAN-2004-1060 has a different root cause and cannot be worked around with p_pmtu_strategy=3. To work around both CAN-2005-1192 and CAN-2004-1060 ip_pmtu_strategy=0 must be used. Please refer to the Manual Actions section below for a summary of the required actions. Workarounds: CAN-2004-0790 and CAN-2004-0791 Filter out the following ICMP messages: Type 3, Code 2 (Destination Unreachable, Protocol Unreachable) Type 3, Code 3 (Destination Unreachable, Port Unreachable) Type 4, Code 0 (Source Quench) CAN-2004-1060 Set ip_pmtu_strategy=0. Note: Filtering "Protocol Unreachable" and "Port Unreachable" should not be done without careful testing. Filtering these out may interfere with the correct functioning of network components. Filtering "Source Quench" should present little risk. Setting ip_pmtu_strategy=0 ================== Edit /etc/rc.config.d/nddconf to add the following: TRANSPORT_NAME[n]=ip NDD_NAME[n]=ip_pmtu_strategy NDD_VALUE[n]=0 where 'n' is the next available index value as described in the nddconf comments. This value will take effect when the system is rebooted. Until the system can be rebooted use the following command to read the /etc/rc.config.d/nddconf file and set the tunable parameters: /usr/bin/ndd -c The ip_pmtu_strategy parameter can be displayed by the following command: /usr/bin/ndd -get /dev/ip ip_pmtu_strategy Note: Since open connections will remain potentially vulnerable until they are closed and certain internal data structures are released it is recommended that the system be rebooted. Note: There is a defect that will cause "ndd -c" to fail if there are more than 10 directives in /etc/rc.config.d/nddconf. That defect is fixed in the following patches: B.11.11 - PHNE_25644 or subsequent B.11.04 - PHNE_26076 or subsequent B.11.00 - PHNE_26125 or subsequent Preliminary binary files ============== ->Preliminary binary files are available for B.11.00 and B.11.22. Patches are available for B.11.11 and B.11.23. The patches and the preliminary binary files address CAN-2004-0790 and CAN-2004-0791 only. Although changes in the patches and binary files for CAN-2004-0790 and CAN-2004-0791 do not prevent the exploit of CAN-2004-1060, they do make it less likely to succeed. Instructions for downloading and installing the binary files are contained in readme files available here: System: hprc.external.hp.com (192.170.19.51) Login: icmp Password: icmp FTP Access: ftp://icmp:icmp@hprc.external.hp.com/ or: ftp://icmp:icmp@192.170.19.51/ Note: The links above may not work for all browsers. If the link fails the url should be entered directly into the browser's address field. Since a patch is available for B.11.11 the readme.11.11.txt and corresponding binary files have been removed from the ftp site. ->Since a patch is available for B.11.23 the readme.11.23.txt and corresponding binary files have been removed from the ftp site. Download the appropriate readme file containing further instructions: readme.11.00.txt readme.11.22.txt Verify the cksum or md5sum: ->Note: The readme files have not changed since rev.1 of this Security Bulletin. cksum readme* 2844254744 2546 readme.11.00.txt 2836317466 2469 readme.11.22.txt md5sum readme* d28504f8532192de6a4f33bba4ea90ec readme.11.00.txt cafbb24f3dc7131501142f75deaeccbd readme.11.22.txt Download and install the binary files as discussed in the readme files. The binary files are available in the same directory as the readme files. For B.11.11 download and install PHNE_33159. The patch is available from < http://itrc.hp.com>. ->For B.11.23 download and install PHNE_32606. The patch is available from < http://itrc.hp.com>. MANUAL ACTIONS: Yes - NonUpdate 1. Set ip_pmtu_strategy=0 2. EITHER a. Filter out the following ICMP messages: Type 3, Code 2 (Destination Unreachable, Protocol Unreachable) Type 3, Code 3 (Destination Unreachable, Port Unreachable) Type 4, Code 0 (Source Quench) OR b. Install the appropriate binary file or patch (binary file not available for B.11.04). BULLETIN REVISION HISTORY: Revision 0: 25 May 2005 Initial release Revision 1: 1 June 2005 Binary files for B.11.00 and B.11.22 are available. Added information about CAN-2004-1060. The "set ip_pmtu_strategy=0" workaround is required even if binary files are installed. Removed IPSec information. Revision 2: 19 June 2005 TOUR (Transport Optional Upgrade Release) on B.11.11 and B.11.23 is potentially vulnerable. Added a description of the sequence number check implemented in the binary files. Revision 3: 27 June 2005 PHNE_33159 is available for B.11.11. The B.11.11 binary files have been removed from the ftp site. Revision 4: 10 July 2005 PHNE_32606 is available for B.11.23. The B.11.23 binary files have been removed from the ftp site. HP-UX SPECIFIC SECURITY BULLETINS*: Security Patch Check revision B.02.00 analyzes all HP-issued Security Bulletins to provide a subset of recommended actions that potentially affect a specific HP-UX system. For more information: http://www.software.hp.com/cgi-bin/swdepot_parser.cgi/cgi/ displayProductInfo.pl?productNumber=B6834AA SUPPORT: For further information, contact normal HP Services support channel. REPORT: To report a potential security vulnerability with any HP supported product, send Email to: security-alert@hp.com. It is strongly recommended that security related information being communicated to HP be encrypted using PGP, especially exploit information. To obtain the security-alert PGP key please send an e-mail message to security-alert@hp.com with the Subject of 'get key' (no quotes). SUBSCRIBE: To initiate a subscription to receive future HP Security Bulletins via Email: http://h30046.www3.hp.com/driverAlertProfile.php?regioncode=NA& langcode=USENG&jumpid=in_SC-GEN__driverITRC&topiccode=ITRC On the web page: ITRC security bulletins and patch sign-up Under Step1: your IRTC security bulletins and patches - check ALL categories for which alerts are required and continue. Under Step2: your IRTC operating systems - verify your operating system selections are checked and save. To update an existing subscription: http://h30046.www3.hp.com/subSignIn.php Log in on the web page Subscriber's choice for Business: sign-in. On the Web page: Subscriber's Choice: your profile summary - use Edit Profile to update appropriate sections. To review previously published Security Bulletins visit: http://itrc.hp.com/service/cki/secBullArchive.do * The Software Product Category that this Security Bulletin relates to is represented by the 5th and 6th characters of the Bulletin number: GN = HP General SW, MA = HP Management Agents, MI = Misc. 3rd party SW, MP = HP MPE/iX, NS = HP NonStop Servers, OV = HP OpenVMS, PI = HP Printing & Imaging, ST = HP Storage SW, TL = HP Trusted Linux, TU = HP Tru64 UNIX, UX = HP-UX, VV = HP Virtual Vault System management and security procedures must be reviewed frequently to maintain system integrity. HP is continually reviewing and enhancing the security features of software products to provide customers with current secure solutions. "HP is broadly distributing this Security Bulletin in order to bring to the attention of users of the affected HP products the important security information contained in this Bulletin. HP recommends that all users determine the applicability of this information to their individual situations and take appropriate action. HP does not warrant that this information is necessarily accurate or complete for all user situations and, consequently, HP will not be responsible for any damages resulting from user's use or disregard of the information provided in this Bulletin. To the extent permitted by law, HP disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement." (c)Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Hewlett-Packard Company shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein. The information provided is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. To the extent permitted by law, neither HP nor its affiliates, subcontractors or suppliers will be liable for incidental, special or consequential damages including downtime cost; lost profits; damages relating to the procurement of substitute products or services; or damages for loss of data, or software restoration. The information in this document is subject to change without notice. Hewlett-Packard Company and the names of Hewlett-Packard products referenced herein are trademarks of Hewlett-Packard Company in the United States and other countries. Other product and company names mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective owners. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 8.1 iQA/AwUBQtJVE+AfOvwtKn1ZEQKwPwCeLKNxE1048xGZniru4epJ6YAqYIcAn2+Y fjKXZ3hbnTeQeIn9Kk9ePC1d =cFE+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- . HP Tru64 UNIX 5.1B-3 HP Tru64 UNIX 5.1B-2/PK4 HP Tru64 UNIX 5.1A PK HP Tru64 UNIX 4.0G PK4 HP Tru64 UNIX 4.0F PK8 BACKGROUND: Special Instructions for the Customer The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) (RFC 792) is used in the Internet Architecture to perform fault-isolation and recovery (RFC816), which is the group of actions that hosts and routers take to determine if a network failure has occurred. The industry standard TCP specification (RFC 793) has a vulnerability whereby ICMP packets can be used to perform a variety of attacks such as blind connection reset attacks and blind throughput-reduction attacks. Path MTU Discovery (RFC 1191) describes a technique for dynamically discovering the MTU (maximum transmission unit) of an arbitrary internet path. This protocol uses ICMP packets from the router to discover the MTU for a TCP connection path. HP has addressed these potential vulnerabilities by providing a new kernel tunable in Tru64 UNIX V5.1B and 5.1A, icmp_tcpseqcheck. In Tru64 4.0F and 4.0G, HP has introduced two new kernel tunables, icmp_tcpseqcheck and icmp_rejectcodemask. This behavior protects TCP against spoofed ICMP packets. Set the tunable as follows: icmp_tcpseqcheck=1 (default) Provides a level of protection that reduces the possibility of considering a spoofed ICMP packet as valid to one in two raised to the thirty-second power. icmp_tcpseqcheck=0 Retains existing behavior, i.e., accepts all ICMP packets icmp_rejectcodemask In the Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers (RFC 1812), research suggests that the use of ICMP Source Quench packets is an ineffective (and unfair) antidote for congestion. Thus, HP recommends completely ignoring ICMP Source Quench packets using the icmp_rejectcodemask tunable. The icmp_rejectcodemask is a bitmask that designates the ICMP codes that the system should reject. For example, to reject ICMP Source Quench packets, set the mask bit position for the ICMP_SOURCEQUENCH code 4, which is two to the 4th power = 16 (0x10 hex). The icmp_rejectcodemask tunable can be used to reject any ICMP packet type, or multiple masks can be combined to reject more than one type. Note: the ICMP type codes are defined in "/usr/include/netinet/ip_icmp.h". Set the tunable as follows: icmp_rejectcodemask = 0x10 Rejects ICMP Source Quench packets icmp_rejectcodemask = 0 (default) Retains existing behavior, i.e., accepts all ICMP packets Adjusting the variables The ICMP sequence check variable (icmp_tcpseqcheck) can be adjusted using the sysconfig and sysconfigdb commands: # sysconfig -q inet icmp_tcpseqcheck inet: icmp_tcpseqcheck = 1 # sysconfig -r inet icmp_tcpseqcheck=0 icmp_tcpseqcheck: reconfigured # sysconfig -q inet icmp_tcpseqcheck inet: icmp_tcpseqcheck = 0 # sysconfig -q inet icmp_tcpseqcheck > /tmp/icmp_tcpseqcheck_merge # sysconfigdb -m -f /tmp/icmp_tcpseqcheck_merge inet # sysconfigdb -l inet inet: icmp_tcpseqcheck = 1 Similarly, the icmp_rejectcodemask variable can be adjusted using the sysconfig and sysconfigdb commands: # sysconfig -q inet icmp_rejectcodemask inet: icmp_rejectcodemask = 0 # sysconfig -r inet icmp_rejectcodemask=0x10 icmp_rejectcodemask: reconfigured # sysconfig -q inet icmp_rejectcodemask inet: icmp_rejectcodemask = 16 # sysconfig -q inet icmp_rejectcodemask > /tmp/icmp_rejectcodemask_merge # sysconfigdb -m -f /tmp/icmp_rejectcodemask_merge inet # sysconfigdb -l inet inet: icmp_rejectcodemask = 16 RESOLUTION: Until the corrections are available in a mainstream release patch kit, HP is releasing the following Early Release Patch (ERP) kits publicly for use by any customer. The ERP kits use dupatch to install and will not install over any installed Customer Specific Patches (CSPs) that have file intersections with the ERPs. Contact your service provider for assistance if the ERP installation is blocked by any of your installed CSPs. The fixes contained in the ERP kits are scheduled to be available in the following mainstream patch kits: HP Tru64 Unix 5.1B-4 Early Release Patches The ERPs deliver the following file: /sys/BINARY/inet.mod HP Tru64 UNIX 5.1B-3 ERP Kit Name: T64KIT0025925-V51BB26-ES-20050628 Kit Location: http://www.itrc.hp.com/service/patch/patchDetail.do? patchid=T64KIT0025925-V51BB26-ES-20050628 MD5 checksum: 129251787a426320af16cd584b982027 HP Tru64 UNIX 5.1B-2/PK4 ERP Kit Name: T64KIT0025924-V51BB25-ES-20050628 Kit Location: http://www.itrc.hp.com/service/patch/patchDetail.do? patchid=T64KIT0025924-V51BB25-ES-20050628 MD5 checksum: 5fcc77a6876db6d10ef07ac96e11b3af HP Tru64 UNIX 5.1A PK6 ERP Kit Name: T64KIT0025922-V51AB24-ES-20050628 Kit Location: http://www.itrc.hp.com/service/patch/patchDetail.do? patchid=T64KIT0025922-V51AB24-ES-20050628 MD5 checksum: 7c373b35c95945651a1cfda96bf71421 HP Tru64 UNIX 4.0G PK4 ERP Kit Name: T64KIT0025920-V40GB22-ES-20050628 Kit Location: http://www.itrc.hp.com/service/patch/patchDetail.do? patchid=T64KIT0025920-V40GB22-ES-20050628 MD5 checksum: 13849fd555239d75d300d1cb46dc995f HP Tru64 UNIX 4.0F PK8 ERP Kit Name: DUXKIT0025921-V40FB22-ES-20050628 Kit Location: http://www.itrc.hp.com/service/patch/patchDetail.do? patchid=T64KIT0025920-V40GB22-ES-20050628 MD5 checksum: 743b614d39f185802701b7f2dd14ffa5 MD5 checksums are available from the ITRC patch database main page: http://www.itrc.hp.com/service/patch/mainPage.do - From the patch database main page, click Tru64 UNIX, then click verifying MD5 checksums under useful links. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Want a new IT Security job? Vacant positions at Secunia: http://secunia.com/secunia_vacancies/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco Various Products ICMP Message Handling Denial of Service SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA14904 VERIFY ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/14904/ CRITICAL: Less critical IMPACT: DoS WHERE: >From remote OPERATING SYSTEM: Cisco Content Services Switch 11000 Series (WebNS) http://secunia.com/product/1507/ Cisco Global Site Selector (GSS) 4480 1.x http://secunia.com/product/2270/ Cisco IOS 10.x http://secunia.com/product/184/ Cisco IOS 11.x http://secunia.com/product/183/ Cisco IOS 12.x http://secunia.com/product/182/ Cisco IOS R11.x http://secunia.com/product/53/ Cisco IOS R12.x http://secunia.com/product/50/ Cisco IOS XR (CRS-1) 3.x http://secunia.com/product/4907/ Cisco ONS 15000 Series http://secunia.com/product/684/ Cisco PIX 6.x http://secunia.com/product/56/ Cisco SAN-OS 1.x (MDS 9000 Switches) http://secunia.com/product/3214/ DESCRIPTION: Fernando Gont has published an Internet-Draft describing how ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). Cisco has acknowledged that various Cisco products are affected. The published Internet-Draft details three types of attacks, which utilize the following ICMP messages to cause a negative impact on TCP connections either terminating or originating from a vulnerable device. SOLUTION: See patch matrix in vendor advisory for information about fixes. http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050412-icmp.shtml#software PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Fernando Gont ORIGINAL ADVISORY: Cisco: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050412-icmp.shtml NISCC: http://www.niscc.gov.uk/niscc/docs/al-20050412-00308.html ICMP attacks against TCP: http://www.gont.com.ar/drafts/icmp-attacks-against-tcp.html OTHER REFERENCES: RFC1122 (Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Communication Layers): http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1122.txt RFC1191 (Path MTU Discovery): http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1191.txt ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help everybody keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . The RFC recommends no security checking for in-bound ICMP messages, so long as a related connection exists, and may potentially allow several different Denials of Service. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CVE-2004-0790 to this issue. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CVE-2004-0791 to this issue. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CVE-2004-1060 to this issue. Vulnerable Supported Versions System Binaries ---------------------------------------------------------------------- OpenServer 5.0.6 ip and tcp drivers OpenServer 5.0.7 ip and tcp drivers 3. Solution The proper solution is to install the latest packages. OpenServer 5.0.6 4.1 Location of Fixed Binaries ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenServer/SCOSA-2006.4 4.2 Verification MD5 (VOL.000.000) = 03ed8e901780e1535c113efeba72d8cd md5 is available for download from ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/security/tools 4.3 Installing Fixed Binaries The following packages should be installed on your system before you install this fix: RS506A OSS646 ERG711746: ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenServer/SCOSA-2005.3/SCOSA-2005.3.txt ERG712606: ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenServer/SCOSA-2005.9/SCOSA-2005.9.txt Upgrade the affected binaries with the following sequence: 1) Download the VOL* files to a directory. 2) Run the custom command, specify an install from media images, and specify the directory as the location of the images. OpenServer 5.0.7 5.1 Location of Fixed Binaries ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenServer/SCOSA-2006.4 5.2 Verification MD5 (VOL.000.000) = 03ed8e901780e1535c113efeba72d8cd md5 is available for download from ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/security/tools 5.3 Installing Fixed Binaries The following package should be installed on your system before you install this fix: OSR507MP4 - OpenServer 5, Release 5.0.7 Maintenance Pack 4 Upgrade the affected binaries with the following sequence: 1) Download the VOL* files to a directory. 2) Run the custom command, specify an install from media images, and specify the directory as the location of the images. References Specific references for this advisory: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2004-0790 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2004-0791 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2004-1060 SCO security resources: http://www.sco.com/support/security/index.html SCO security advisories via email http://www.sco.com/support/forums/security.html This security fix closes SCO incidents sr892503 fz530662 erg712759. Disclaimer SCO is not responsible for the misuse of any of the information we provide on this website and/or through our security advisories. Our advisories are a service to our customers intended to promote secure installation and use of SCO products. Acknowledgments The SCO Group would like to thank Fernando Gont for reporting these issues. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ . This fixes some vulnerabilities, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service) on an active TCP session

AFFECTED PRODUCTS