ID

VAR-201008-0201

CVE

CVE-2010-1578

TITLE

plural Cisco Product SunRPC Service interruption in inspection function (DoS) Vulnerabilities

DESCRIPTION

Unspecified vulnerability in the SunRPC inspection feature on Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 5500 series devices with software 7.2 before 7.2(5), 8.0 before 8.0(5.19), 8.1 before 8.1(2.47), and 8.2 before 8.2(2) and Cisco PIX Security Appliances 500 series devices allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via crafted SunRPC UDP packets, aka Bug ID CSCtc77567. plural Cisco Run on product SunRPC The inspection function includes SunRPC UDP Service operation disruption due to incomplete packet processing (DoS) There is a vulnerability that becomes a condition. The problem is Bug ID : CSCtc77567 It is a problem.Skillfully crafted by a third party SunRPC UDP Service disruption via packets (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause affected devices to reload, triggering a denial-of-service condition. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug IDs CSCtc77567 and CSCte61710. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "From 2007 to 2009 vulnerabilities in a typical end-user PC almost doubled from about 220 to 420." Non-Microsoft software to blame for increase in vulnerabilities affecting typical Windows end-users, read more: http://secunia.com/gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco ASA 5500 Series Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA40842 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40842 RELEASE DATE: 2010-08-05 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40842 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Some vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco ASA (Adaptive Security Appliance) 5500 Series, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). 1) Three errors exist in the SunRPC inspection engine while processing certain SunRPC messages. This can be exploited to reload a device via specially crafted UDP SunRPC packets that transit the appliance. 3) An error in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) inspection feature can be exploited to trigger an appliance reload via a specially crafted SIP packet that transits the appliance via TCP or UDP port 5060. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: cisco-sa-20100804-asa: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . There are workarounds for some of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. This advisory is posted at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml Note: The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is affected by the SunRPC DoS vulnerabilities. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the FWSM. Affected versions of Cisco ASA Software will vary depending on the specific vulnerability. Vulnerable Products +------------------ For specific version information, refer to the Software Versions and Fixes section of this advisory. A successful attack may result in a sustained DoS condition. Versions 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SunRPC inspection is enabled by default. To check if SunRPC inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sunrpc" command and confirm that output, such as what is displayed in the following example, is returned. ciscoasa# show service-policy | include sunrpc Inspect: sunrpc, packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 The following configuration commands are used to enable SunRPC inspection in the Cisco ASA. class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sunrpc ... A successful attack may result in a sustained DoS condition. Versions 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, 8.2.x, and 8.3.x are affected by one or more of these vulnerabilities. A Cisco ASA device configured for any of the following features is affected: * Secure Socket Layer Virtual Private Network (SSL VPN) * When the affected device is configured to accept Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) connections * TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection * Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access when using HTTPS SSL VPN (or WebVPN) is enabled with the "enable <interface name>" command in "webvpn" configuration mode. SSL VPN is disabled by default. The following configuration snippet provides an example of a SSL VPN configuration. webvpn enable outside ... ASDM access is affected by three of these vulnerabilities. To use ASDM, the HTTPS server must be enabled to allow HTTPS connections to the Cisco ASA. The server can be enabled using the "http server enable [port]" command. The default port is 443. To specify hosts that can access the HTTP server internal to the security appliance, use the "http" command in global configuration mode. The TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is affected by these vulnerabilities. This feature was introduced in Cisco ASA version 8.0(2) and is disabled by default. To determine if the TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is enabled on the device, use the show tls-proxy command, as shown in the following example: ciscoasa# show tls-proxy Maximum number of sessions: 1200 TLS-Proxy 'sip_proxy': ref_cnt 1, seq# 3 Server proxy: Trust-point: local_ccm Client proxy: Local dynamic certificate issuer: LOCAL-CA-SERVER Local dynamic certificate key-pair: phone_common Cipher suite: aes128-sha1 aes256-sha1 Run-time proxies: Proxy 0xcbae1538: Class-map: sip_ssl, Inspect: sip Active sess 1, most sess 3, byte 3456043 ... <output truncated> TLS proxy supports SIP and Skinny protocols. TLS proxy for Skinny inspection can be enabled using the "inspect skinny <skinny_map> tls-proxy <proxy_name>", as shown in the following example: asa(config-pmap)# class inspection_default asa(config-pmap-c)# inspect skinny my-inspect tls-proxy my-tls-proxy asa(config)# service-policy global_policy global Note: Secure SCCP uses TCP port 2443; however, it can be configured to a different port. TLS proxy for SIP inspection can be enabled using the "inspect sip <map> tls-proxy <proxy_name>", as shown in the following example: asa(config-pmap)# class inspection_default asa(config-pmap-c)# inspect sip my-inspect tls-proxy my-tls-proxy asa(config)# service-policy global_policy global The Cisco ASA is also vulnerable when the Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access feature is used with HTTPS. This feature is enabled for direct authentication using HTTPS with the "aaa authentication listener https" command, as shown in the following example: ASA(config)# aaa authentication listener https inside port 443 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A DoS vulnerability affects the SIP inspection feature of Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x are not affected. Versions 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SIP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SIP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sip" command and confirm that output, such as what is displayed in the following example, is returned. ciscoasa#show service-policy | include sip Inspect: sip , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SIP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sip ... ! service-policy global_policy global Note: The service policy could also be applied to a specific interface instead of a global configuration shown in the previous example. IKE is not enabled by default. If IKE is enabled, the "isakmp enable <interface name>" command appears in the configuration. For more information, refer to the End of Life announcement at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps5708/ps5709/ps2030/end_of_life_notice_cisco_pix_525_sec_app.html How to Determine the Running Software Version ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To determine whether a vulnerable version of Cisco ASA Software is running on an appliance, administrators can issue the "show version" command. The following example shows a Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance that is running software version 8.3(1): ASA#show version | include Version Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software Version 8.3(1) Device Manager Version 6.3(1) Customers who use Cisco ASDM to manage devices can locate the software version in the table that is displayed in the login window or upper-left corner of the Cisco ASDM window. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- With the exception of the Cisco FWSM, no other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. It offers firewall, intrusion prevention system (IPS), anti-X, and VPN services. Sun RPC is used by Network File System (NFS) and Network Information Service (NIS). Sun RPC services can run on any port. When a client attempts to access a Sun RPC service on a server, it must learn the port that service is running on. The client does this by querying the port mapper process, usually rpcbind, on the well-known port of 111. Note: Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can be triggered by using UDP packets, not TCP. Transport Layer Security (TLS) Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ TLS and its predecessor, SSL, are cryptographic protocols that provide security for communications over IP data networks such as the Internet. A Cisco ASA device configured for SSL VPN, TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection, or configured to accept ASDM management connections is vulnerable. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SIP, as defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), enables call handling sessions, particularly two-party audio conferences, or "calls." SIP works with SDP for call signalling. SDP specifies the ports for the media stream. Using SIP, the Cisco ASA can support any SIP VoIP gateways and VoIP proxy servers. To support SIP calls through the Cisco ASA, signaling messages for the media connection addresses, media ports, and embryonic connections for the media must be inspected, because while the signaling is sent over a well-known destination port (UDP/TCP 5060), the media streams are dynamically allocated. Also, SIP embeds IP addresses in the user-data portion of the IP packet. SIP inspection applies NAT for these embedded IP addresses. SIP inspection is enabled by default. Note: Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCtd32106 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-2816. Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ IPsec is an IP security feature that provides robust authentication and encryption of IP packets. IKE is a key management protocol standard that is used in conjunction with the IPsec standard. A DoS vulnerability exists in the IKE implementation of the Cisco ASA. Note: Only traffic that is destined to the appliance may trigger this vulnerability when the affected device is configured for IPsec remote access or site-to-site VPNs. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCte46507 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-2817. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922 and CSCtc85753 - SunRPC Inspection DoS Vulnerabilities CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd32627, CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259- Transport Layer Security (TLS) DoS Vulnerabilities CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd32106 - Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection DoS Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCte46507 - Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message DoS Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of any of the vulnerabilities described in this security advisory may cause the affected device to reload. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Vulnerability | Major | First Fixed | | | Release | Release | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | SunRPC Inspection DoS Vulnerabilities |---------+----------------| | (CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922, and | 8.0 | 8.0(5.19) | | CSCtc85753) |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.46) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | Not vulnerable | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | TLS DoS Vulnerabilities (CSCtd32627, |---------+----------------| | CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259) | 8.0 | 8.0(5.15) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.44) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.17) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | 8.3(1.6) | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | Not vulnerable | | SIP Inspection DoS Vulnerability |---------+----------------| | (CSCtd32106) | 8.0 | 8.0(5.17) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.45) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.13) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | Not vulnerable | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.11) | | |---------+----------------| | | | Vulnerable; | | | 7.1 | migrate to | | | | 7.2(5) | | |---------+----------------| | IKE Message DoS Vulnerability | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | (CSCte46507) |---------+----------------| | | 8.0 | 8.0(5.15) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.44) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.10) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | 8.3(1.1) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Note: Cisco ASA Software versions 7.1.x are affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. However, no fixed 7.1.x software versions are planned because the 7.1.x major release has reached the End of Software Maintenance Releases milestone. Refer to the EOL/EOS for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance Software v7.1 notice for further information: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps6032/ps6094/ps6120/end_of_life_notice_cisco_asa_5500_series_adaptive_sec_app_sw.html Recommended Releases ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The following table lists all recommended releases. These recommended releases contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Major Release | Recommended Release | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.0 | 7.0(8.11) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.1 | Vulnerable; migrate to 7.2(5) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.0 | 8.0(5.19) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.1 | 8.1(2.47) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.2 | 8.2(2.17) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.3 | 8.3(2) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Software Download ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cisco ASA Software versions 7.0(8.11), 8.0(5.19), 8.1(2.46), and 8.2(2.17) can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ASAPSIRT?psrtdcat20e2 Cisco ASA Software versions 7.2(5) and 8.3(2) can be downloaded from: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/pub/Redirect.x?mdfid=279513386 Workarounds =========== This Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities and their respective workarounds are independent of each other. In addition to the recommendations described below, mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100804-asa.shtml SunRPC Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ These vulnerabilities can be mitigated by disabling SunRPC inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SunRPC inspection by issuing the "no inspect sunrpc" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. Transport Layer Security (TLS) Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ If SSL VPN (clientless or client-based) is not needed, it can be disabled by issuing the "clear configure webvpn" command. Administrators should make sure that ASDM connections are only allowed from trusted hosts. To identify the IP addresses from which the security appliance accepts HTTPS connections for ASDM, configure the http command for each trusted host address or subnet. The following example, shows how a trusted host with IP address 192.168.1.100 is added to the configuration: hostname(config)# http 192.168.1.100 255.255.255.255 The TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is affected by these vulnerabilities. This feature can be disabled if it is not needed. Temporarily disabling the feature will mitigate these vulnerabilities. The Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access feature, when configured for HTTPS, is affected by these vulnerabilities. The only workaround is to disable the feature if not needed. To disable HTTPS Cut-Through Proxy authentication use the "no aaa authentication listener https" command, as shown in the following example: ASA(config)# no aaa authentication listener https inside port 443 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling SIP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SIP inspection by issuing the "no inspect sip" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ There are no workarounds for this vulnerability apart from disabling IKE on the affected device. The "no crypto isakmp enable <interface-name>" command can be used to disable IKE on a specific interface. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. One of the TLS DoS vulnerabilities was reported to Cisco by CERT-FI. All the other vulnerabilities described in this advisory were found during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2010-August-04 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iD8DBQFMWYoH86n/Gc8U/uARAg8JAJ0W8ZSUZ0ldj0ncoIfxVKVuVeieygCgkLs4 GGmQ+3yNpX0udKpkA2431fg= =yQWz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

AFFECTED PRODUCTS

CVSS

PROBLEMTYPE DATA

THREAT TYPE

remote

TYPE

lack of information

CONFIGURATIONS

EXPLOIT AVAILABILITY

PATCH

EXTERNAL IDS

REFERENCES

CREDITS

Cisco

SOURCES

LAST UPDATE DATE

2024-11-23T21:56:18.928000+00:00

SOURCES UPDATE DATE

SOURCES RELEASE DATE