ID

VAR-201602-0004

CVE

CVE-2015-7547

TITLE

glibc vulnerable to stack buffer overflow in DNS resolver

DESCRIPTION

Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in the (1) send_dg and (2) send_vc functions in the libresolv library in the GNU C Library (aka glibc or libc6) before 2.23 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted DNS response that triggers a call to the getaddrinfo function with the AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET6 address family, related to performing "dual A/AAAA DNS queries" and the libnss_dns.so.2 NSS module. GNU glibc is an open source C language compiler released under the LGPL license agreement. It is an implementation of the C library in the Linux operating system. An attacker can use the vulnerability to launch an attack on a Linux host or related devices by constructing a malicious DNS service or using a man-in-the-middle attack, which results in remote code execution and can be obtained. User terminal control. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Debian Security Advisory DSA-3480-1 security@debian.org https://www.debian.org/security/ Florian Weimer February 16, 2016 https://www.debian.org/security/faq - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Package : eglibc CVE ID : CVE-2014-8121 CVE-2015-1781 CVE-2015-7547 CVE-2015-8776 CVE-2015-8777 CVE-2015-8778 CVE-2015-8779 Debian Bug : 779587 796105 798316 801691 803927 812441 812445 812455 Several vulnerabilities have been fixed in the GNU C Library, eglibc. The CVE-2015-7547 vulnerability listed below is considered to have critical impact. CVE-2014-8121 Robin Hack discovered that the nss_files database did not correctly implement enumeration interleaved with name-based or ID-based lookups. This could cause the enumeration enter an endless loop, leading to a denial of service. CVE-2015-1781 Arjun Shankar discovered that the _r variants of host name resolution functions (like gethostbyname_r), when performing DNS name resolution, suffered from a buffer overflow if a misaligned buffer was supplied by the applications, leading to a crash or, potentially, arbitrary code execution. Most applications are not affected by this vulnerability because they use aligned buffers. CVE-2015-7547 The Google Security Team and Red Hat discovered that the eglibc host name resolver function, getaddrinfo, when processing AF_UNSPEC queries (for dual A/AAAA lookups), could mismanage its internal buffers, leading to a stack-based buffer overflow and arbitrary code execution. This vulnerability affects most applications which perform host name resolution using getaddrinfo, including system services. CVE-2015-8776 Adam Nielsen discovered that if an invalid separated time value is passed to strftime, the strftime function could crash or leak information. Applications normally pass only valid time information to strftime; no affected applications are known. CVE-2015-8777 Hector Marco-Gisbert reported that LD_POINTER_GUARD was not ignored for SUID programs, enabling an unintended bypass of a security feature. This update causes eglibc to always ignore the LD_POINTER_GUARD environment variable. CVE-2015-8778 Szabolcs Nagy reported that the rarely-used hcreate and hcreate_r functions did not check the size argument properly, leading to a crash (denial of service) for certain arguments. No impacted applications are known at this time. CVE-2015-8779 The catopen function contains several unbound stack allocations (stack overflows), causing it the crash the process (denial of service). No applications where this issue has a security impact are currently known. The following fixed vulnerabilities currently lack CVE assignment: Joseph Myers reported discovered that an integer overflow in the strxfrm can lead to heap-based buffer overflow, possibly allowing arbitrary code execution. In addition, a fallback path in strxfrm uses an unbounded stack allocation (stack overflow), leading to a crash or erroneous application behavior. Kostya Serebryany reported that the fnmatch function could skip over the terminating NUL character of a malformed pattern, causing an application calling fnmatch to crash (denial of service). Joseph Myers reported that the IO_wstr_overflow function, internally used by wide-oriented character streams, suffered from an integer overflow, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow. On GNU/Linux systems, wide-oriented character streams are rarely used, and no affected applications are known. Andreas Schwab reported a memory leak (memory allocation without a matching deallocation) while processing certain DNS answers in getaddrinfo, related to the _nss_dns_gethostbyname4_r function. This vulnerability could lead to a denial of service. While it is only necessary to ensure that all processes are not using the old eglibc anymore, it is recommended to reboot the machines after applying the security upgrade. We recommend that you upgrade your eglibc packages. ============================================================================ Ubuntu Security Notice USN-2900-1 February 16, 2016 eglibc, glibc vulnerability ============================================================================ A security issue affects these releases of Ubuntu and its derivatives: - Ubuntu 15.10 - Ubuntu 14.04 LTS - Ubuntu 12.04 LTS Summary: GNU C Library could be made to crash or run programs if it received specially crafted network traffic. Update instructions: The problem can be corrected by updating your system to the following package versions: Ubuntu 15.10: libc6 2.21-0ubuntu4.1 Ubuntu 14.04 LTS: libc6 2.19-0ubuntu6.7 Ubuntu 12.04 LTS: libc6 2.15-0ubuntu10.13 After a standard system update you need to reboot your computer to make all the necessary changes. References: http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-2900-1 CVE-2015-7547 Package Information: https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/glibc/2.21-0ubuntu4.1 https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/eglibc/2.19-0ubuntu6.7 https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/eglibc/2.15-0ubuntu10.13 . Here are the details from the Slackware 14.1 ChangeLog: +--------------------------+ patches/packages/glibc-2.17-i486-11_slack14.1.txz: Rebuilt. This update provides a patch to fix the stack-based buffer overflow in libresolv that could allow specially crafted DNS responses to seize control of execution flow in the DNS client (CVE-2015-7547). However, due to a patch applied to Slackware's glibc back in 2009 (don't use the gethostbyname4() lookup method as it was causing some cheap routers to misbehave), we were not vulnerable to that issue. Nevertheless it seems prudent to patch the overflows anyway even if we're not currently using the code in question. Thanks to mancha for the backported patch. For more information, see: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-7547 (* Security fix *) patches/packages/glibc-i18n-2.17-i486-11_slack14.1.txz: Rebuilt. patches/packages/glibc-profile-2.17-i486-11_slack14.1.txz: Rebuilt. patches/packages/glibc-solibs-2.17-i486-11_slack14.1.txz: Rebuilt. +--------------------------+ Where to find the new packages: +-----------------------------+ Thanks to the friendly folks at the OSU Open Source Lab (http://osuosl.org) for donating FTP and rsync hosting to the Slackware project! :-) Also see the "Get Slack" section on http://slackware.com for additional mirror sites near you. Updated packages for Slackware 14.1: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-14.1/patches/packages/glibc-2.17-i486-11_slack14.1.txz ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-14.1/patches/packages/glibc-i18n-2.17-i486-11_slack14.1.txz ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-14.1/patches/packages/glibc-profile-2.17-i486-11_slack14.1.txz ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-14.1/patches/packages/glibc-solibs-2.17-i486-11_slack14.1.txz Updated packages for Slackware x86_64 14.1: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware64-14.1/patches/packages/glibc-2.17-x86_64-11_slack14.1.txz ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware64-14.1/patches/packages/glibc-i18n-2.17-x86_64-11_slack14.1.txz ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware64-14.1/patches/packages/glibc-profile-2.17-x86_64-11_slack14.1.txz ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware64-14.1/patches/packages/glibc-solibs-2.17-x86_64-11_slack14.1.txz Updated packages for Slackware -current: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-current/slackware/a/glibc-solibs-2.23-i586-1.txz ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-current/slackware/l/glibc-2.23-i586-1.txz ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-current/slackware/l/glibc-i18n-2.23-i586-1.txz ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-current/slackware/l/glibc-profile-2.23-i586-1.txz Updated packages for Slackware x86_64 -current: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware64-current/slackware64/a/glibc-solibs-2.23-x86_64-1.txz ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware64-current/slackware64/l/glibc-2.23-x86_64-1.txz ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware64-current/slackware64/l/glibc-i18n-2.23-x86_64-1.txz ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware64-current/slackware64/l/glibc-profile-2.23-x86_64-1.txz MD5 signatures: +-------------+ Slackware 14.1 packages: 4c56432d638adc8098661cfa818b5bc9 glibc-2.17-i486-11_slack14.1.txz 5c316d6b0a8970fe15fbdf2adff8de19 glibc-i18n-2.17-i486-11_slack14.1.txz a937d842e5ca3d0b125230c23285f8f4 glibc-profile-2.17-i486-11_slack14.1.txz 442f01d094d350612c1fb1fcb5e7fbe7 glibc-solibs-2.17-i486-11_slack14.1.txz Slackware x86_64 14.1 packages: eec88d584a79909ec79aae1c43c330d3 glibc-2.17-x86_64-11_slack14.1.txz d8b396eb6ada65d1555e3cf0fb8246c2 glibc-i18n-2.17-x86_64-11_slack14.1.txz e7deaabfe3e467cbde10ba5b7748bbbb glibc-profile-2.17-x86_64-11_slack14.1.txz 629c93f0e510d354ff66e61f1ebe8b67 glibc-solibs-2.17-x86_64-11_slack14.1.txz Slackware -current packages: b11873e4f851a600b57a2e7a2ac8f472 a/glibc-solibs-2.23-i586-1.txz 5116eec63fab5e7dbc58d27fecd48684 l/glibc-2.23-i586-1.txz ae9b8a8e4ead59aa398212d6893d7ddc l/glibc-i18n-2.23-i586-1.txz 61154e43ee4c0739dd5d3c4ce3b60ae6 l/glibc-profile-2.23-i586-1.txz Slackware x86_64 -current packages: c48a55c8a39dc8e17e04796e4f160bd0 a/glibc-solibs-2.23-x86_64-1.txz 36104e1a004b0e97d193c2132f18222d l/glibc-2.23-x86_64-1.txz e0415f66d17323c8f6df339cfd49051b l/glibc-i18n-2.23-x86_64-1.txz f5433793e9da696a60f2445559f1d33f l/glibc-profile-2.23-x86_64-1.txz Installation instructions: +------------------------+ Upgrade the packages as root: # upgradepkg glibc-*.txz +-----+ Slackware Linux Security Team http://slackware.com/gpg-key security@slackware.com +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | To leave the slackware-security mailing list: | +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Send an email to majordomo@slackware.com with this text in the body of | | the email message: | | | | unsubscribe slackware-security | | | | You will get a confirmation message back containing instructions to | | complete the process. Please do not reply to this email address. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Note: the current version of the following document is available here: https://h20564.www2.hpe.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/docDisplay?docId=emr_n a-c04989404 SUPPORT COMMUNICATION - SECURITY BULLETIN Document ID: c04989404 Version: 1 HPSBGN03547 rev.1 - HPE Helion Eucalyptus Node Controller and other Helion Eucalyptus Components using glibc, Remote Arbitrary Code Execution NOTICE: The information in this Security Bulletin should be acted upon as soon as possible. Release Date: 2016-02-18 Last Updated: 2016-02-18 Potential Security Impact: Remote Arbitrary Code Execution Source: Hewlett Packard Enterprise, Product Security Response Team VULNERABILITY SUMMARY A security vulnerability in glibc has been addressed with HPE Helion Eucalyptus Node Controller and other Helion Eucalyptus components. The vulnerability could be exploited remotely resulting in arbitrary execution of code. - Helion Eucalyptus Node Controller (NC) components are confirmed to be affected by the vulnerability. Other Helion Eucalyptus components and pre-bundled service EMIs do not directly expose the vulnerability, but because glibc is a commonly used library on Linux, the exact exposure is hard to determine. Any software performing domain name resolution is potentially vulnerable. References: - CVE-2015-7547 - PSRT110035 SUPPORTED SOFTWARE VERSIONS*: ONLY impacted versions are listed. - HPE Helion Eucalyptus 4.2.1 and earlier - HPE Helion Eucalyptus Service EMIs for Load Balancing and Imaging services package "eucalyptus-service-image-1.48-0.87.99" and earlier BACKGROUND CVSS 2.0 Base Metrics =========================================================== Reference Base Vector Base Score CVE-2015-7547 (AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:C/A:P) 6.1 =========================================================== Information on CVSS is documented in HP Customer Notice: HPSN-2008-002 RESOLUTION HPE has made the following software updates and workaround information available to resolve the vulnerability with glibc for HPE Helion Eucalyptus. + All hosts running HPE Helion Eucalyptus services should be upgraded to the latest glibc. Updated glibc packages are available for RHEL and CentOS: https://access.redhat.com/articles/2161461 **RHEL Note:** After following the guidelines for RHEL, a reboot is the safest and recommended way to ensure that updates takes effect for all services. + New Helion Eucalyptus Service EMIs will be made available soon in the Eucalyptus software repositories at: http://downloads.eucalyptus.com/software/eucalyptus/4.2/ **Note:** This security bulletin will be revised when those updates are available. Until Helion Eucalyptus EMI updates are available, the following workaround is available to update the instances launched from eucalyptus-service-image-1.48-0.87.99 and earlier to the latest glibc packages. **Workaround:** As a cloud administrator: 1) create an update-glibc script with the following content: #! /bin/bash yum update -y glibc 2) set the following cloud properties to use that script on instance start: euctl services.imaging.worker.init_script=@update-glibc euctl services.loadbalancing.worker.init_script=@update-glibc This script will be automatically executed for each of the new instances started from the service image. For instances that are already running, the cloud administrator will need to terminate them and start again for the script to take effect. More specifically, for the Load Balancing service, the cloud admin needs to find all instances running under the "(eucalyptus)loadbalancing" account: # euare-accountlist | grep loadbalancing (eucalyptus)loadbalancing <accnt_id> # euca-describe-instances verbose | grep <accnt_id> And terminate them using euca-terminate-instances. New updated instances will be started automatically after that. For the Imaging Service, the imaging worker needs to be terminated and started again: # esi-manage-stack -a delete imaging # esi-manage-stack -a create imaging HISTORY Version:1 (rev.1) - 17 February 2016 Initial release Third Party Security Patches: Third party security patches that are to be installed on systems running Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE) software products should be applied in accordance with the customer's patch management policy. Support: For issues about implementing the recommendations of this Security Bulletin, contact normal HPE Services support channel. For other issues about the content of this Security Bulletin, send e-mail to security-alert@hpe.com. Report: To report a potential security vulnerability with any HPE supported product, send Email to: security-alert@hpe.com Subscribe: To initiate a subscription to receive future HPE Security Bulletin alerts via Email: http://www.hpe.com/support/Subscriber_Choice Security Bulletin Archive: A list of recently released Security Bulletins is available here: http://www.hpe.com/support/Security_Bulletin_Archive Software Product Category: The Software Product Category is represented in the title by the two characters following HPSB. 3C = 3COM 3P = 3rd Party Software GN = HPE General Software HF = HPE Hardware and Firmware MU = Multi-Platform Software NS = NonStop Servers OV = OpenVMS PV = ProCurve ST = Storage Software UX = HP-UX Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Hewlett Packard Enterprise shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein. The information provided is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. To the extent permitted by law, neither HP or its affiliates, subcontractors or suppliers will be liable for incidental,special or consequential damages including downtime cost; lost profits; damages relating to the procurement of substitute products or services; or damages for loss of data, or software restoration. The information in this document is subject to change without notice. Hewlett Packard Enterprise and the names of Hewlett Packard Enterprise products referenced herein are trademarks of Hewlett Packard Enterprise in the United States and other countries. Other product and company names mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective owners. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJWxlQSAAoJEGIGBBYqRO9/BNUIALmKRtlIKTAy46Mm7LX6/mE/ 0jiJxzcSNSQcAaKXyyIlcW8YFys3vweG7jNx1ucD8HHJArlb6FJIfT3vTzZ9YorZ ETLnDKa2yplMae8tsookmc6HxsvDpV/4C63nArnAc/yMUO1ODulsCiwNCCukVb4J WPqWTHyYoL0wlKj0cC63BARPNaNBUIQ+mdztJY30o2mIvjTJCUrdMs9HmVnRae0d GA0kY3WWNTqie+9y9R4IvO24i3GH5fYqlhjSonki0RccvyAb2PquoS7IMcu1ITy0 9HwcgVXQayCm/kfYkGDulm+XvrPCJDMjit8D74gGrPWY23NOM4FYR3s8/OuOOlU= =Ex8F -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- . Weber, S. Cisco Small Business RV Series Routers offer virtual private networking (VPN) technology so your remote workers can connect to your network through a secure Internet pathway." Source: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/routers/small-business-rv-series-routers/index.html Business recommendation: ------------------------ We want to thank Cisco for the very quick and professional response and great coordination. Customers are urged to update the firmware of their devices. Vulnerability overview/description: ----------------------------------- 1) Hardcoded Credentials The device contains hardcoded users and passwords which can be used to login via SSH on an emulated device at least. During the communication with Cisco it turned out that: "Accounts like the 'debug-admin' and 'root' can not be accessed from console port, CLI or webui". Therefore, these accounts had no real functionality and cannot be used for malicious actions. The outdated version was found by IoT Inspector. The outdated version was found by IoT Inspector. 4) Multiple Vulnerabilities - IoT Inspector Report Further information can be found in IoT Inspector report: https://r.sec-consult.com/ciscoiot Proof of concept: ----------------- 1) Hardcoded Credentials The following hardcoded hashes were found in the 'shadow' file of the firmware: root:$1$hPNSjUZA$7eKqEpqVYltt9xJ6f0OGf0:15533:0:99999:7::: debug-admin:$1$.AAm0iJ4$na9wZwly9pSrdS8MhcGKw/:15541:0:99999:7::: [...] The undocumented user 'debug-admin' is also contained in this file. Starting the dropbear daemon as background process on emulated firmware: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # dropbear -E # [1109] <timestamp> Running in background # # [1112] <timestamp> Child connection from <IP>:52718 [1112] <timestamp> /var must be owned by user or root, and not writable by others [1112] <timestamp> Password auth succeeded for 'debug-admin' from <IP>:52718 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Log on via another host connected to the same network. For this PoC the password of the debug-admin was changed in the 'shadow' file. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [root@localhost medusa]# ssh debug-admin@<IP> /bin/ash -i debug-admin@<IP>'s password: /bin/ash: can't access tty; job control turned off BusyBox v1.23.2 (2018-11-21 18:22:56 IST) built-in shell (ash) /tmp $ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The 'debug-admin' user has the same privileges like 'root'. This can be determined from the corresponding sudoers file in the firmware: [...] ## User privilege specification ## root ALL=(ALL) ALL debug-admin ALL=(ALL) ALL ## Uncomment to allow members of group wheel to execute any command # %wheel ALL=(ALL) ALL [...] During the communication with Cisco it turned out that: "Accounts like the 'debug-admin' and 'root' can not be accessed from console port, CLI or webui". Therefore, these accounts had no real functionality and cannot be used for malicious actions. # python cve-2015-7547-poc.py & [1] 961 # chroot /medusa_rootfs/ bin/ash BusyBox v1.23.2 (2018-11-21 18:22:56 IST) built-in shell (ash) # gdb cve-2015-7547_glibc_getaddrinfo [...] [UDP] Total Data len recv 36 [UDP] Total Data len recv 36 Connected with 127.0.0.1:41782 [TCP] Total Data len recv 76 [TCP] Request1 len recv 36 [TCP] Request2 len recv 36 Cannot access memory at address 0x4 Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # ls "pressing <TAB>" test ]55;test.txt # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4) Multiple Vulnerabilities - IoT Inspector Report Further information can be found in IoT Inspector report: https://r.sec-consult.com/ciscoiot The summary is below: IoT Inspector Vulnerability #1 BusyBox CVE entries Outdated BusyBox version is affected by 7 published CVEs. IoT Inspector Vulnerability #2 curl CVE entries Outdated curl version is affected by 35 published CVEs. IoT Inspector Vulnerability #9 Linux Kernel Privilege Escalation “pp_key” Outdated Linux Kernel version is affected by CVE-2015-7547. IoT Inspector Vulnerability #10 OpenSSL CVE entries Outdated OpenSSL version affected by 6 published CVEs. Clarification which of the reported issues will be fixed. The vendor added the RV160 and RV260 router series to be vulnerable to the same issues too. Solution: --------- Upgrade to the newest available firmware version. Additionally, the vendor provides the following security notice: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20190904-sb-vpnrouter Workaround: ----------- None. Weber / @2019 . + 3PAR OS 3.2.1 MU5 and 3.2.2 MU2 - HPE recommends prior impacted versions update to 3PAR OS 3.2.1 MU 5 or 3.2.2 MU2. - glibc has been updated in these releases to resolve the glibc vulnerability. + 3PAR OS 3.1.3 is also vulnerable but will not be fixed. **Mitigation:** The best protection to guard against exploitation of this vulnerability is to securely configure and operate the storage array in accordance with the *HPE 3PAR Configuration Guidelines* documentation. SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20210901-0 > ======================================================================= title: Multiple vulnerabilities product: see "Vulnerable / tested versions" vulnerable version: see "Vulnerable / tested versions" fixed version: see "Solution" CVE number: CVE-2021-39278, CVE-2021-39279 impact: High homepage: https://www.moxa.com/ found: 2020-08-31 by: T. Weber (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos company Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com ======================================================================= Vendor description: ------------------- "Together, We Create Change Moxa is committed to making a positive impact around the world. We put our all behind this commitment--from our employees, to our products and supply chain. In our local communities, we nurture and support the spirit of volunteering. We encourage our employees to contribute to community development, with an emphasis on ecology, education, and health. In our products, we invest in social awareness programs and environment-friendly policies at every stage of the product lifecycle. We make sure our manufacturing meets the highest standards with regards to quality, ethics, and sustainability." Source: https://www.moxa.com/en/about-us/corporate-responsibility Business recommendation: ------------------------ SEC Consult recommends to immediately apply the available patches from the vendor. A thorough security review should be performed by security professionals to identify further potential security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: ----------------------------------- 1) Authenticated Command Injection (CVE-2021-39279) An authenticated command injection vulnerability can be triggered by issuing a GET request to the "/forms/web_importTFTP" CGI program which is available on the web interface. An attacker can abuse this vulnerability to compromise the operating system of the device. This issue was found by emulating the firmware of the device. 2) Reflected Cross-Site Scripting via Manipulated Config-File (CVE-2021-39278) Via a crafted config-file, a reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability can be exploited in the context of the victim's browser. This config-file can be uploaded to the device via the "Config Import Export" tab in the main menu. 3) Known GNU glibc Vulnerabilities (CVE-2015-0235) The used GNU glibc in version 2.9 is outdated and contains multiple known vulnerabilities. One of the discovered vulnerabilities (CVE-2015-0235, gethostbyname "GHOST" buffer overflow) was verified by using the MEDUSA scalable firmware runtime. 4) Multiple Outdated Software Components Multiple outdated software components containing vulnerabilities were found by the IoT Inspector. The vulnerabilities 1), 2) and 3) were manually verified on an emulated device by using the MEDUSA scalable firmware runtime. Proof of concept: ----------------- 1) Authenticated Command Injection (CVE-2021-39279) The vulnerability can be triggered by navigating in the web interface to the tab: "Main Menu"->"Maintenance"->"Config Import Export" The "TFTP Import" menu is prone to command injection via all parameters. To exploit the vulnerability, an IP address, a configuration path and a filename must be set. If the filename is used to trigger the exploit, the payload in the interceptor proxy would be: http://192.168.1.1/forms/web_importTFTP?servIP=192.168.1.1&configPath=/&fileName=name|`ping localhost -c 100` 2) Reflected Cross-Site Scripting via Manipulated Config-File (CVE-2021-39278) The vulnerability can be triggered by navigating in the web interface to the tab: "Main Menu"->"Maintenance"->"Config Import Export" The "Config Import" menu is prone to reflected cross-site scripting via the upload of config files. Example of malicious config file: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [board] deviceName="WAC-2004_0000</span><script>alert(document.cookie)</script>" deviceLocation="" [..] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Uploading such a crafted file triggers cross-site scripting as the erroneous value is displayed without filtering characters. 3) Known GNU glibc Vulnerabilities (CVE-2015-0235) GNU glibc version 2.9 contains multiple CVEs like: CVE-2016-1234, CVE-2015-7547, CVE-2013-7423, CVE-2013-1914, and more. The gethostbyname buffer overflow vulnerability (GHOST) was checked with the help of the exploit code from https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2015/q1/274. It was compiled and executed on the emulated device to test the system. 4) Multiple Outdated Software Components The IoT Inspector recognized multiple outdated software components with known vulnerabilities: BusyBox 1.18.5 06/2011 Dropbear SSH 2011.54 11/2011 GNU glibc 2.9 02/2009 Linux Kernel 2.6.27 10/2008 OpenSSL 0.9.7g 04/2005 Only found in the program "iw_director" OpenSSL 1.0.0 03/2010 Vulnerable / tested versions: ----------------------------- The following firmware versions for various devices have been identified to be vulnerable: * WAC-2004 / 1.7 * WAC-1001 / 2.1 * WAC-1001-T / 2.1 * OnCell G3470A-LTE-EU / 1.7 * OnCell G3470A-LTE-EU-T / 1.7 * TAP-323-EU-CT-T / 1.3 * TAP-323-US-CT-T / 1.3 * TAP-323-JP-CT-T / 1.3 * WDR-3124A-EU / 2.3 * WDR-3124A-EU-T / 2.3 * WDR-3124A-US / 2.3 * WDR-3124A-US-T / 2.3 Vendor contact timeline: ------------------------ 2020-10-09: Contacting vendor through moxa.csrt@moxa.com. 2020-10-12: Contact sends PGP key for encrypted communication and asks for the detailed advisory. Sent encrypted advisory to vendor. 2020-11-06: Status update from vendor regarding technical analysis. Vendor requested more time for fixing the vulnerabilities as more products are affected. 2020-11-09: Granted more time for fixing to vendor. 2020-11-10: Vendor asked for next steps regarding the advisory publication. 2020-11-11: Asked vendor for an estimation when a public disclosure is possible. 2020-11-16: Vendor responded that the product team can give a rough feedback. 2020-11-25: Asked for a status update. 2020-11-25: Vendor responded that the investigation is not done yet. 2020-12-14: Vendor provided a list of potential affected devices and stated that full investigation may take until January 2021 due to the list of CVEs that were provided with the appended IoT Inspector report. The patches may be available until June 2021. 2020-12-15: Shifted next status update round with vendor on May 2021. 2020-12-23: Vendor provided full list of affected devices. 2021-02-05: Vendor sieved out the found issues from 4) manually and provided a full list of confirmed vulnerabilities. WAC-2004 phased-out in 2019. 2021-02-21: Confirmed receive of vulnerabilities, next status update in May 2021. 2021-06-10: Asking for an update. 2021-06-15: Vendor stated, that the update will be provided in the next days. 2021-06-21: Vendor will give an update in the next week as Covid gets worse in Taiwan. 2021-06-23: Vendor stated, that patches are under development. Vendor needs more time to finish the patches. 2021-06-24: Set release date to 2021-09-01. 2021-07-02: Vendor provides status updates. 2021-08-16: Vendor provides status updates. 2021-08-17: Vendor asks for CVE IDs and stated, that WDR-3124A has phased-out. 2021-08-20: Sent assigned CVE-IDs to vendor. Asked for fixed version numbers. 2021-08-31: Vendor provides fixed firmware version numbers and the advisory links. 2021-09-01: Coordinated release of security advisory. Solution: --------- According to the vendor the following patches must be applied to fix issues: * WAC-1001 / 2.1.5 * WAC-1001-T / 2.1.5 * OnCell G3470A-LTE-EU / 1.7.4 * OnCell G3470A-LTE-EU-T / 1.7.4 * TAP-323-EU-CT-T / 1.8.1 * TAP-323-US-CT-T / 1.8.1 * TAP-323-JP-CT-T / 1.8.1 The Moxa Technical Support must be contacted for requesting the security patches. The corresponding security advisories for the affected devices are available on the vendor's website: TAP-323/WAC-1001/WAC-2004 https://www.moxa.com/en/support/product-support/security-advisory/tap-323-wac-1001-2004-wireless-ap-bridge-client-vulnerabilities OnCell G3470A-LTE/WDR-3124A https://www.moxa.com/en/support/product-support/security-advisory/oncell-g3470a-wdr-3124a-cellular-gateways-router-vulnerabilities The following device models are EOL and should be replaced: * WAC-2004 * WDR-3124A-EU * WDR-3124A-EU-T * WDR-3124A-US * WDR-3124A-US-T Workaround: ----------- None. Advisory URL: ------------- https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab SEC Consult, an Atos company Europe | Asia | North America About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos company. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult? Send us your application https://sec-consult.com/career/ Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult? Contact our local offices https://sec-consult.com/contact/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Mail: research at sec-consult dot com Web: https://www.sec-consult.com Blog: http://blog.sec-consult.com Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult EOF Thomas Weber / @2021

AFFECTED PRODUCTS

CVSS

PROBLEMTYPE DATA

THREAT TYPE

remote

TYPE

buffer error

EXPLOIT AVAILABILITY

PATCH

EXTERNAL IDS

REFERENCES

CREDITS

T. Weber

SOURCES

LAST UPDATE DATE

2024-10-18T21:14:27.889000+00:00

SOURCES UPDATE DATE

SOURCES RELEASE DATE