ID

VAR-201912-0635

CVE

CVE-2019-8671

TITLE

plural Apple Updates to product vulnerabilities

DESCRIPTION

Multiple memory corruption issues were addressed with improved memory handling. This issue is fixed in iOS 12.4, macOS Mojave 10.14.6, tvOS 12.4, Safari 12.1.2, iTunes for Windows 12.9.6, iCloud for Windows 7.13, iCloud for Windows 10.6. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution. Apple Has released an update for each product.The expected impact depends on each vulnerability, but can be affected as follows: * Arbitrary code execution * Insufficient access restrictions * information leak * Service operation interruption (DoS) * Information falsification * Privilege escalation * Sandbox avoidance. WebKit is prone to the following security vulnerabilities: 1. Multiple cross-site scripting vulnerabilities 2. Multiple memory-corruption vulnerabilities Attackers can exploit these issues to execute arbitrary script code in the browser of an unsuspecting user in the context of the affected site or execute arbitrary code and perform unauthorized actions; Failed exploit attempts will result in denial-of-service conditions. Apple Safari, etc. are all products of Apple (Apple). Apple Safari is a web browser that is the default browser included with the Mac OS X and iOS operating systems. Apple iOS is an operating system developed for mobile devices. Apple tvOS is a smart TV operating system. WebKit is one of the web browser engine components. The following products and versions are affected: Apple iOS prior to 12.4; Windows-based iTunes prior to 12.9.6; tvOS prior to 12.4; Safari prior to 12.1.2; Windows-based iCloud prior to 10.6 and prior to 7.13; macOS Versions prior to Mojave 10.14.6. WebKitGTK and WPE WebKit prior to version 2.24.1 failed to properly apply configured HTTP proxy settings when downloading livestream video (HLS, DASH, or Smooth Streaming), an error resulting in deanonymization. This issue was corrected by changing the way livestreams are downloaded. (CVE-2019-6237) WebKitGTK and WPE WebKit prior to version 2.24.1 are vulnerable to address bar spoofing upon certain JavaScript redirections. An attacker could cause malicious web content to be displayed as if for a trusted URI. This is similar to the CVE-2018-8383 issue in Microsoft Edge. (CVE-2019-8601) An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved input validation. (CVE-2019-8644) A logic issue existed in the handling of synchronous page loads. (CVE-2019-8689) A logic issue existed in the handling of document loads. (CVE-2019-8719) This fixes a remote code execution in webkitgtk4. No further details are available in NIST. This issue is fixed in watchOS 6.1. This issue is fixed in watchOS 6.1. This issue is fixed in watchOS 6.1. (CVE-2019-8766) "Clear History and Website Data" did not clear the history. The issue was addressed with improved data deletion. This issue is fixed in macOS Catalina 10.15. A user may be unable to delete browsing history items. (CVE-2019-8768) An issue existed in the drawing of web page elements. Visiting a maliciously crafted website may reveal browsing history. (CVE-2019-8769) This issue was addressed with improved iframe sandbox enforcement. (CVE-2019-8846) WebKitGTK up to and including 2.26.4 and WPE WebKit up to and including 2.26.4 (which are the versions right prior to 2.28.0) contains a memory corruption issue (use-after-free) that may lead to arbitrary code execution. (CVE-2020-10018) A use-after-free flaw exists in WebKitGTK. This flaw allows remote malicious users to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service. A malicious website may be able to cause a denial of service. A DOM object context may not have had a unique security origin. A file URL may be incorrectly processed. (CVE-2020-3885) A race condition was addressed with additional validation. An application may be able to read restricted memory. (CVE-2020-3901) An input validation issue was addressed with improved input validation. (CVE-2020-3902). JSC: DFG: Loop-invariant code motion (LICM) leaves object property access unguarded Related CVE Numbers: CVE-2019-8671. While fuzzing JavaScriptCore, I encountered the following (modified and commented) JavaScript program which crashes jsc from current HEAD and release (/System/Library/Frameworks/JavaScriptCore.framework/Resources/jsc): function v2(trigger) { // Force JIT compilation. for (let v7 = 0; v7 < 1000000; v7++) { } if (!trigger) { // Will synthesize .length, .callee, and Symbol.iterator. // See ScopedArguments::overrideThings [1] arguments.length = 1; } for (let v11 = 0; v11 < 10; v11++) { // The for-of loop (really the inlined array iterator) will fetch the // .length property after a StructureCheck. However, the property fetch // will be hoisted in front of the outer loop by LICM but the // StructureCheck won't. Then, in the final invocation it will crash // because .length hasn't been synthezised yet (and thus the butterfly // is nullptr). for (const v14 of arguments) { const v18 = {a:1337}; // The with statement here probably prevents escape analysis / // object allocation elimination from moving v18 into the stack, // thus forcing DFG to actually allocate v18. Then, LICM sees a // write to structure IDs (from the object allocation) and thus // cannot hoist the structure check (reading a structure ID) in // front of the loop. with (v18) { } } } } for (let v23 = 0; v23 < 100; v23++) { v2(false); } print(\"Triggering crash\"); v2(true); Here is what appears to be happening: When v2 is optimized by the FTL JIT, it will inline the ArrayIterator.next function for the for-of loop and thus produce the following DFG IR (of which many details were omitted for readability): Block #8 (Before outer loop) ... Block #10 (bc#180): \t\t(Outer loop) 104:<!0:-> CheckStructure(Check:Cell:@97, MustGen, [%Cp:Arguments], R:JSCell_structureID, Exits, bc#201, ExitValid) 105:< 2:-> GetButterfly(Cell:@97, Storage|UseAsOther, Other, R:JSObject_butterfly, Exits, bc#201, ExitValid) Block #12 (bc#464 --> next#<no-hash>:<0x10a8a08c0> bc#43 --> arrayIteratorValueNext#<no-hash>:<0x10a8a0a00> bc#29): (Inner loop header) 378:< 4:-> GetByOffset(Check:Untyped:@105, KnownCell:@97, JS|PureInt|UseAsInt, BoolInt32, id2{length}, 100, R:NamedProperties(2), Exits, bc#34, ExitValid) predicting BoolInt32 Block #17 (bc#487): \t\t(Inner loop body) 267:< 8:-> NewObject(JS|UseAsOther, Final, %B8:Object, R:HeapObjectCount, W:HeapObjectCount, Exits, bc#274, ExitValid) 273:<!0:-> PutByOffset(KnownCell:@267, KnownCell:@267, Check:Untyped:@270, MustGen, id7{a}, 0, W:NamedProperties(7), ClobbersExit, bc#278, ExitValid) 274:<!0:-> PutStructure(KnownCell:@267, MustGen, %B8:Object -> %EQ:Object, ID:45419, R:JSObject_butterfly, W:JSCell_indexingType,JSCell_structureID,JSCell_typeInfoFlags,JSCell_typeInfoType, ClobbersExit, bc#278, ExitInvalid) Eventually, the loop-invariant code motion optimization runs [2], changing graph to the following: Block #8 (Before outer loop) ... 105:< 2:-> GetButterfly(Cell:@97, Storage|UseAsOther, Other, R:JSObject_butterfly, Exits, bc#201, ExitValid) 378:< 4:-> GetByOffset(Check:Untyped:@105, KnownCell:@97, JS|PureInt|UseAsInt, BoolInt32, id2{length}, 100, R:NamedProperties(2), Exits, bc#34, ExitValid) predicting BoolInt32 Block #10 (bc#180): \t\t(Outer loop) 104:<!0:-> CheckStructure(Check:Cell:@97, MustGen, [%Cp:Arguments], R:JSCell_structureID, Exits, bc#201, ExitValid) Block #12 (bc#464 --> next#<no-hash>:<0x10a8a08c0> bc#43 --> arrayIteratorValueNext#<no-hash>:<0x10a8a0a00> bc#29): (Inner loop header) Block #17 (bc#487): \t\t(Inner loop body) 267:< 8:-> NewObject(JS|UseAsOther, Final, %B8:Object, R:HeapObjectCount, W:HeapObjectCount, Exits, bc#274, ExitValid) 273:<!0:-> PutByOffset(KnownCell:@267, KnownCell:@267, Check:Untyped:@270, MustGen, id7{a}, 0, W:NamedProperties(7), ClobbersExit, bc#278, ExitValid) 274:<!0:-> PutStructure(KnownCell:@267, MustGen, %B8:Object -> %EQ:Object, ID:45419, R:JSObject_butterfly, W:JSCell_indexingType,JSCell_structureID,JSCell_typeInfoFlags,JSCell_typeInfoType, ClobbersExit, bc#278, ExitInvalid) Here, the GetButterfly and GetByOffset operations, responsible for loading the .length property, were moved in front of the StructureCheck which is supposed to ensure that .length can be loaded in this way. This is clearly unsafe and will lead to a crash in the final invocation of the function when .length is not \"synthesized\" and thus the butterfly is nullptr. To understand why this happens it is necessary to look at the requirements for hoisting operations [3]. One of them is that \"The node doesn't read anything that the loop writes.\". In this case the CheckStructure operation reads the structure ID from the object (\"R:JSCell_structureID\" in the IR above) and the PutStructure writes a structure ID (\"W:JSCell_indexingType,JSCell_structureID,JSCell_typeInfoFlags,JSCell_typeInfoType\") as such the check cannot be hoisted because DFG cannot prove that the read value doesn't change in the loop body (note that here the compiler acts conservatively as it could, in this specific instance, determine that the structure ID being written to inside the loop is definitely not the one being read. It doesn't do so and instead only tracks abstract \"heap locations\" like the JSCell_structureID). However, as no operation in the loop bodies writes to either the JSObject_butterfly or the NamedProperties heap location (i.e. no Butterfly pointer or NamedProperty slot is ever written to inside the loop body), LICM incorrectly determined that the GetButterfly and GetByOffset operations could safely be hoisted in front of the loop body. See also https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1775 and https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1789 for more information about the LICM optimization. I suspect that this issue is more general (not limited to just `argument` objects) and allows bypassing of various StructureChecks in the JIT, thus likely being exploitable in many ways. However, I haven't confirmed that. This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse or a patch has been made broadly available (whichever is earlier), the bug report will become visible to the public. [1] https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/blob/5dfe4ae818eba9866d5979035b72c482c16cbd6b/Source/JavaScriptCore/runtime/ScopedArguments.cpp#L130 [2] https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/blob/5dfe4ae818eba9866d5979035b72c482c16cbd6b/Source/JavaScriptCore/dfg/DFGPlan.cpp#L445 [3] https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/blob/5dfe4ae818eba9866d5979035b72c482c16cbd6b/Source/JavaScriptCore/dfg/DFGLICMPhase.cpp#L168 Found by: saelo@google.com . CVE-2019-8649: Sergei Glazunov of Google Project Zero Installation note: Safari 12.1.2 may be obtained from the Mac App Store. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Debian Security Advisory DSA-4515-1 security@debian.org https://www.debian.org/security/ Alberto Garcia September 04, 2019 https://www.debian.org/security/faq - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Package : webkit2gtk CVE ID : CVE-2019-8644 CVE-2019-8649 CVE-2019-8658 CVE-2019-8666 CVE-2019-8669 CVE-2019-8671 CVE-2019-8672 CVE-2019-8673 CVE-2019-8676 CVE-2019-8677 CVE-2019-8678 CVE-2019-8679 CVE-2019-8680 CVE-2019-8681 CVE-2019-8683 CVE-2019-8684 CVE-2019-8686 CVE-2019-8687 CVE-2019-8688 CVE-2019-8689 CVE-2019-8690 Several vulnerabilities have been discovered in the webkit2gtk web engine: CVE-2019-8644 G. For the stable distribution (buster), these problems have been fixed in version 2.24.4-1~deb10u1. We recommend that you upgrade your webkit2gtk packages. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 APPLE-SA-2019-8-13-4 Additional information for APPLE-SA-2019-7-22-5 tvOS 12.4 tvOS 12.4 addresses the following: Bluetooth Available for: Apple TV 4K and Apple TV HD Impact: An attacker in a privileged network position may be able to intercept Bluetooth traffic (Key Negotiation of Bluetooth - KNOB) Description: An input validation issue existed in Bluetooth. CVE-2019-9506: Daniele Antonioli of SUTD, Singapore, Dr. Nils Ole Tippenhauer of CISPA, Germany, and Prof. Kasper Rasmussen of University of Oxford, England Entry added August 13, 2019 Core Data Available for: Apple TV 4K and Apple TV HD Impact: A remote attacker may be able to leak memory Description: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2019-8646: Natalie Silvanovich of Google Project Zero Core Data Available for: Apple TV 4K and Apple TV HD Impact: A remote attacker may be able to cause arbitrary code execution Description: A use after free issue was addressed with improved memory management. CVE-2019-8647: Samuel Groß and Natalie Silvanovich of Google Project Zero Core Data Available for: Apple TV 4K and Apple TV HD Impact: A remote attacker may be able to cause unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution Description: A memory corruption issue was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2019-8660: Samuel Groß and Natalie Silvanovich of Google Project Zero FaceTime Available for: Apple TV 4K and Apple TV HD Impact: A remote attacker may be able to cause arbitrary code execution Description: A memory corruption issue was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2019-8648: Tao Huang and Tielei Wang of Team Pangu Foundation Available for: Apple TV 4K and Apple TV HD Impact: A remote attacker may be able to cause unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution Description: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2019-8641: Samuel Groß and Natalie Silvanovich of Google Project Zero Heimdal Available for: Apple TV 4K and Apple TV HD Impact: An issue existed in Samba that may allow attackers to perform unauthorized actions by intercepting communications between services Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks to prevent unauthorized actions. CVE-2018-16860: Isaac Boukris and Andrew Bartlett of the Samba Team and Catalyst libxslt Available for: Apple TV 4K and Apple TV HD Impact: A remote attacker may be able to view sensitive information Description: A stack overflow was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2019-13118: found by OSS-Fuzz Profiles Available for: Apple TV 4K and Apple TV HD Impact: A malicious application may be able to restrict access to websites Description: A validation issue existed in the entitlement verification. CVE-2019-8698: Luke Deshotels, Jordan Beichler, and William Enck of North Carolina State University; Costin Carabaș and Răzvan Deaconescu of University POLITEHNICA of Bucharest Quick Look Available for: Apple TV 4K and Apple TV HD Impact: An attacker may be able to trigger a use-after-free in an application deserializing an untrusted NSDictionary Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks. CVE-2019-8662: Natalie Silvanovich and Samuel Groß of Google Project Zero Siri Available for: Apple TV 4K and Apple TV HD Impact: A remote attacker may be able to leak memory Description: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2019-8646: Natalie Silvanovich of Google Project Zero UIFoundation Available for: Apple TV 4K and Apple TV HD Impact: Parsing a maliciously crafted office document may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution Description: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2019-8658: akayn working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative WebKit Available for: Apple TV 4K and Apple TV HD Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution Description: Multiple memory corruption issues were addressed with improved memory handling. CVE-2019-8644: G. Geshev working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative CVE-2019-8666: Zongming Wang (王宗明) and Zhe Jin (金哲) from Chengdu Security Response Center of Qihoo 360 Technology Co. Ltd. CVE-2019-8669: akayn working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative CVE-2019-8671: Apple CVE-2019-8672: Samuel Groß of Google Project Zero CVE-2019-8673: Soyeon Park and Wen Xu of SSLab at Georgia Tech CVE-2019-8676: Soyeon Park and Wen Xu of SSLab at Georgia Tech CVE-2019-8677: Jihui Lu of Tencent KeenLab CVE-2019-8678: Anthony Lai (@darkfloyd1014) of Knownsec, Ken Wong (@wwkenwong) of VXRL, Jeonghoon Shin (@singi21a) of Theori, Johnny Yu (@straight_blast) of VX Browser Exploitation Group, Chris Chan (@dr4g0nfl4me) of VX Browser Exploitation Group, Phil Mok (@shadyhamsters) of VX Browser Exploitation Group, Alan Ho (@alan_h0) of Knownsec, Byron Wai of VX Browser Exploitation, P1umer of ADLab of Venustech CVE-2019-8679: Jihui Lu of Tencent KeenLab CVE-2019-8680: Jihui Lu of Tencent KeenLab CVE-2019-8681: G. Geshev working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative CVE-2019-8683: lokihardt of Google Project Zero CVE-2019-8684: lokihardt of Google Project Zero CVE-2019-8685: akayn, Dongzhuo Zhao working with ADLab of Venustech, Ken Wong (@wwkenwong) of VXRL, Anthony Lai (@darkfloyd1014) of VXRL, and Eric Lung (@Khlung1) of VXRL CVE-2019-8686: G. Geshev working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative CVE-2019-8687: Apple CVE-2019-8688: Insu Yun of SSLab at Georgia Tech CVE-2019-8689: lokihardt of Google Project Zero Additional recognition Game Center We would like to acknowledge Min (Spark) Zheng and Xiaolong Bai of Alibaba Inc. for their assistance. MobileInstallation We would like to acknowledge Dany Lisiansky (@DanyL931) for their assistance. Installation note: Apple TV will periodically check for software updates. Alternatively, you may manually check for software updates by selecting "Settings -> System -> Software Update -> Update Software." To check the current version of software, select "Settings -> General -> About." Information will also be posted to the Apple Security Updates web site: https://support.apple.com/kb/HT201222 This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key, and details are available at: https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJdBAEBCABHFiEEDNXJVNCJJEAVmJdZeC9tht7TK3EFAl1S688pHHByb2R1Y3Qt c2VjdXJpdHktbm9yZXBseUBsaXN0cy5hcHBsZS5jb20ACgkQeC9tht7TK3HyXxAA mG4VzHLTPDCtd3eXkDjN34xahbSiqapl+dcRPoJ4V8yTq2ZM7D+/6Ls4pRD/3oid 46YJfRDaH2J5kufrdYledP0fRXWZoi97tjfgewmP7qKJeftc/9y2qDqBPjnFzHxo 40BZaeVZjupKXyrPlT/Wy8kLZnBtufaEiwbrwkmR05hTuvP6MrQB9gC/YdQnVLTZ 8X7Rd9gIcTPl1cQ9lPvFRSxThsQMzQH69/amMYAhUfwuocn8GbVshVj8LNw7Ie2K pNUqt/UuB+DhQfUTHAlNezVcuWGUWVELkCuF6xv5oy6Z8bbyClOnYmZUmV+Nhqe+ gHmUUGMlhVuJme1mf20eapB+bHX8eXzxC99ScVymHym459V9N2NpGKDQmh3Pb1Cg OYMe7xyA7ckc8upqEl9WI+yyrRjlvuUUPXinmdldXnl0GFRfJfwbzsuoaQylIViE CKd8oOpzcG/dU8FiRYp5vzW9H/LMOTLK2Q1zX5dDhK2V6J/yYfqemnSOEvHhYD5g 08Wm7GaY2kpPqmJ1Vvbtzh9+5AVTNRxpP38xJJde1G8rSUgXs+MkxAh5n6cv+pr/ xpGVpPNsO1uKeRzXjbkTERxH2r8q548caRgKEn6OoOGWhXm6O4YDzopkM6tbe8p1 yIawhwh3AST6+peshxryiatYNsHunnvjpYc72UDiuBU= =KPlq -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

AFFECTED PRODUCTS

CVSS

PROBLEMTYPE DATA

THREAT TYPE

remote

TYPE

buffer error

CONFIGURATIONS

EXPLOIT AVAILABILITY

PATCH

EXTERNAL IDS

REFERENCES

CREDITS

Google Security Research,Apple, Jihui Lu of Tencent KeenLab, Zongming Wang and Zhe Jin from Chengdu Security Response Center of Qihoo 360 Technology Co. Ltd, Jeonghoon Shin of Th,G. Geshev, Apple, Anthony Lai of Knownsec, Ken Wong of VXRL, Soyeon Park and Wen Xu of SSLab at Georgia Tech

SOURCES

LAST UPDATE DATE

2026-02-08T21:12:36.277000+00:00

SOURCES UPDATE DATE

SOURCES RELEASE DATE